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ABSTRACT
Negotiating is a core activity in the public and private sector.
Because of varying public service motivation (PSM) between
public- and private-sector employees, we expect them to
behave differently in negotiations. Moreover, one-shot negoti-
ation settings are often studied even as many real-world
negotiations are repeated exchanges. We apply a repeated lin-
ear public goods game in a laboratory experiment to test the
link between PSM and the level of cooperation by using a
sample of graduate and undergraduate students. The results
show that high-PSM participants, indeed, contributed more
over the entire experiment, and therefore, acted more
cooperatively in a repeated negotiation. Matching negotiators
to opponents with high-PSM, low-PSM did not alter the level
of cooperation in negotiation. Based on this, we conclude that
cooperation in repeated negotiations is not conditional on the
PSM of opponents. We conclude with implications for theory
and practice.
KEYWORDS
laboratory experiment;
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Negotiation is a central activity of employees in both public- and private-
sector organizations. In the public sector, employees negotiate over scarce
budgetary resources or coordinate policy problems. Negotiation outcomes
are often influenced by individual behavior and negotiator motives, such as
value orientation and professional norms (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry,
2015, p. 452), fairness ideals (Reuben & Riedl, 2013), and gender (Van
Vugt & Iredale, 2013).
In the public sector, the rise of New Public Management (NPM) has led
to an increase in negotiations by public-sector employees, such as those
between civil servants and politicians (Hood & Lodge, 2006). Other exam-
ples are performance agreements, concessions, and contracts with
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quasiautonomous nongovernmental organizations (QUANGOs) and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), outsourcing, and tendering (e.g., Lawther, 2006).
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in the private sector have
emphasized contributing to the public good (Holme & Watts, 1999). Thus,
both NPM and CSR have made the public and private sector more alike in
terms of practices.
While the public and private sectors increasingly converge, empirical evi-
dence demonstrates that public- and private-sector employees are dissimilar
in motives (Baarspul & Wilderom, 2011; Esteve, van Witteloostuijn, &
Boyne, 2015), risk propensity (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998; Wildavsky &
Dake, 1990), and in trust (Tepe, 2016). One distinguishing characteristic
between public- and private-sector employees is captured in public service
motivation (PSM) (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). PSM consists of
four dimensions: interest in politics, contributing to the common good,
self-sacrifice, and compassion that could directly impact the process of
negotiations carried out by public-sector employees (Vandenabeele, 2007).
Although negotiation context matters, we presume that a compassionate
negotiator will act more cooperatively under otherwise equal contexts,
equal circumstances, and equal payoffs.
If, indeed, public-sector employees act more cooperatively in a number
of settings, public negotiators may get less “mileage” out of public means,
as public-sector employees “give more than they take.” In more complex or
multidimensional negotiations, public-sector negotiators could be negotia-
tors who are more efficient by arriving at agreement faster and with
less friction by focusing on cooperation. Moreover, cooperation could
lead to higher joint outcomes that are beneficial for society as a whole.
Competitive negotiators, on the other hand, are more likely to use bluffing
or unethical tactics, and they are more likely to lie (Robinson, Lewicki, &
Donahue, 2000; Ross & Robertson, 2000). On top of that, Steinel and de
Dreu (2004) found that cooperative negotiators faced with competitive
negotiators over-responded by using even more deceptive tactics. In other
words, when public managers represent public organizations, their competi-
tive or cooperative behavior may influence the probability of agreement to
a large degree, which, in turn, may have societal consequences.
In a recent study examining three prisoners’ problem games, Esteve et al.
(2015) found that individuals with high PSM scores acted cooperatively,
even when they knew that this was not in their personal interest. Another
study used a quasiexperimental approach, with single-shot interactions
(Esteve, Urbig, van Witteloostuijn, & Boyne, 2016). Our study extends the
work of Esteve et al. (2015) by focusing on cooperation in a repeated negoti-
ation game. Repeated interactions in negotiation are important as this forces
negotiators to act more honestly, more cooperatively, and with more concern
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about their future reputation (Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002, p. 90).
Many negotiations in the public and private sector are repetitive. Repeated
negotiations are found in service contracting (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004), in
public-sector reform and cutback management (Bouckaert, Peters, &
Verhoest, 2010), in international diplomacy, EU policy implementation or
enlargement negotiations (Br€ucker, Schr€oder, & Weise, 2004), and in public-
private partnerships when private companies and municipalities negotiate
practical implementation in infrastructural projects (Osborne, 2000).
Negotiation studies in public management research are scarce; the char-
acteristics of public-sector workers are not considered in the negotiation lit-
erature. Moreover, although repeated negotiations are common in practice,
scholars have focused on single-shot interactions.
In this article, we aim to fill this gap by focusing on negotiation behavior
in a repeated negotiation game. We focus on the differences in a priori
motives between public- and private-sector employees, by using a sample of
graduate and undergraduate students. The main research question of this
study is: Do people with high public service motivation behave more coopera-
tively than people with low public service motivation in repeated negotiations?
Our study contributes in two ways to the public management literature.
First, we study behavior in a repeated negotiation, which differs from single-
shot interactions, which have been studied in relation to cooperative behavior
(Esteve et al., 2015). Repeated negotiations are more realistic in terms of
expectations for negotiators. The expectation of meeting again alters the strat-
egies of negotiators, especially their trust in opponents (Lewicki et al., 2015).
Secondly, we contribute to the developing field of behavioral public
administration by using theoretical insights from social psychology and
experimental economics in the realm of public servants (Grimmelikhuijsen,
Jilke, Olsen, & Tummers, 2017). In addition, we carry out a laboratory
experiment, which reduces the risk of confounding effects while enabling
us to study the causal effect of PSM on negotiation behavior and outcomes.
Theory and hypotheses
Below, we discuss negotiation literature, competitive and cooperative
behavior, and motives of public-sector employees in order to arrive at the
main hypotheses. Next, the experimental design of this study is revealed in
the methods section before we discuss the results and discuss the findings.
Negotiations
Negotiation is “the process of back-and-forth communication aimed at
reaching agreement with others when some of your interests are shared
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and some are opposed” (Ury, 1993, p. 4). All negotiation situations share a
number of common characteristics (Lewicki et al., 2015). Negotiation con-
sists of two or more actors. There is a conflict of (perceived) needs and
desires between the two or more actors. Actors negotiate by choice. A give-
and-take process is expected. Actors prefer to negotiate and privately search
for alternatives rather than be subject to public scrutiny.
The process of negotiation has tangible outcomes, such as prices, and
intangible outcomes, such as the need to win or avoid loss or the need to
obtain or keep a good reputation. Negotiators are interdependent, and the
outcomes are influenced by the interdependence of the parties’ goals
(Raiffa et al., 2002). Generally, two types of negotiations are distinguished:
constant- or zero-sum games or distributive bargaining (where achieving one
party’s goals blocks the other one’s goals), and variable- or nonzero-sum
games or integrative bargaining (where both parties achieve gains without
blocking each other’s goals). Most negotiation settings are somewhere in
between the two, which is called mixed scanning, with both claiming a part
from a fixed pie and creating value by bringing issues on the table into coex-
istence in the same negotiation setting or in varying degrees (Lewicki
et al., 2015).
In public management literature, negotiation research has focused on
power and conflicts (Perry & Levine, 1976), negotiation in networks (Klijn
& Koppenjan, 2012), and, for example, in EU negotiations (Tallberg, 2008).
Similarly, cooperation literatures in public management focus primarily on
organizations, with fewer studies considering the individual negotiator (e.g.,
Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Cooperation and competition in negotiations
Negotiators may choose to compete over a shared set of resources or to
cooperate with their opponents in finding a solution (Lewicki et al., 2015).
Cooperation may lead to greater mutual benefit than does competition
(Fehr & G€achter, 2000). In reality, more options other than cooperation
and defecting may be available to negotiators, such as avoiding and com-
promising. Arguably, these can be seen as a degree of cooperation or
competition (Rahim & Magner, 1995; Shell, 1974). For instance, in pris-
oner-dilemma games, players choose between cooperation and defecting
(Esteve et al., 2015; Raiffa et al., 2002; Schelling, 1980).
In simple negotiation settings, individuals with high self-interest are
thought to employ a competing style, since this maximizes the individual
pay-off at the cost of the pay-off of others. Cooperation is used when indi-
viduals consider the gains of others as well (Antonioni, 1998). Since
individuals often pursue not only rational self-interest, but also other goals,
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such as joint outcomes or a fair distribution of resources, it seems that
their attitude toward goals will affect the selection of negotiation style (De
Dreu & Boles, 1998; Van Lange, 1999).
One-shot and repeated negotiations
In game theory, repeated and one-shot interactions are studied. In one-shot
games, negotiators are concerned with short-term payoffs, as there are no
potential repercussions (Carmichael, 2005). In repeated games, negotiators
consider their own reputation, the shadow of the future, and retaliation
opportunities (Raiffa et al., 2002). For example, Selten and Stoecker (1986)
found that in a finite repeated game, players started with mutual cooper-
ation, followed by an initial defection, and then mutual defection. In gen-
eral, more repetitions seem to induce more cooperative behavior and
defection later (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, & Wilson, 1982), while reputation
effects reduce cooperation (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2003, p. 450).
In other words, players do not always play the dominant strategy for the
period (cf. Aumann, Maschler, & Stearns, 1995).
In games in which players create a public good together, the contribu-
tions and cooperation of players usually start high and decline with time
(Fehr & G€achter, 2000). The introduction of strong punishments—negative
consequences—will also lead players to cooperate. Public-sector negotia-
tions are frequently iterative and repetitive. Individuals have negotiated in
the past, and expect to do so in the future. For instance, public-private
partnerships require many moments of coordination and negotiation
(Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008; Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002; Skelcher, 2005).
Moreover, these types of negotiations are typically cross-sectoral and deal
with issues at more than one level, such as those of practical implementa-
tion and finances. During these repeated negotiations, individual negotia-
tors may choose to cooperate or to compete.
Public service motivation
One distinguishing element between public-sector employees and private-
sector employees is PSM (Perry, 1996). PSM is a set of beliefs, values, and
attitudes that “go beyond self-interest and organizational interest, that con-
cern the interest of a larger political entity and which induces through pub-
lic interaction motivation for targeted action” (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547).
Earlier work has connected PSM to increased odds of whistle-blowing in
the public service (Brewer & Selden, 1998), self-selection into the public
service (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010; Tepe, 2016), and ethical leadership
(Wright, Hassan, & Park, 2016).
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PSM consists of four dimensions: interest in politics, contributing to the
common good, self-sacrifice, and compassion (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele,
2007). Compared to private-sector employees, public-sector employees are
more attached to politics and policy, are interested in working for a public
cause, and have higher levels of compassion and self-sacrifice (Brewer &
Selden, 1998; Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). As public-sector employees
have a higher PSM score than private-sector employees, they are typically
more interested in politics, more compassionate, and more likely to display
self-sacrificial behavior. Moreover, they are motivated to work for a public
cause—essentially, creating a public good. These differences between public
servants and private-sector professionals are often attributed to self-sorting
into either the public or private sector, meaning that people with a set of
social norms and motives are attracted to particular organizations that fit
their motives (Tepe, 2016). We argue that these characteristics are import-
ant in negotiations, as they will affect negotiation behavior. Similarly, these
norms and motivations—PSM—will also make public- and private-sector
employees behave dissimilar when forced to choose between cooperation
and competition, as these appeal to different a priori motives. For example,
compassion has been linked to the desire to engage in future negotiations
and the willingness to achieve joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia,
1997). The potential to achieve future gains is nonexistent in a one-shot
negotiation. In repeated interactions, however, this may lead to more
cooperation. Put differently, repeated negotiations may strengthen the effect
of PSM on cooperation. Similarly, sacrificial behavior is central to the
process of negotiations. When negotiators engage in the “dance of con-
cessions,” they engage in making small sacrifices in order to reach an
agreement. Low PSM individuals will feel less need to make sacrifices in
order to achieve agreement in single-shot negotiations. At the individual
level, this could be beneficial. In repeated interactions, not making sacrifi-
ces may lead to repercussions and punishments.
H1: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators behave more cooperatively than
low-PSM negotiators regardless of their opponent.
If we insist that cooperation is the opposite of competition (Rahim, 2011;
Raiffa et al., 2002; Shell, 1974), then private-sector employees will
behave more competitively in negotiations. When two public-sector
employees negotiate, they will both behave more cooperatively; when two
private-sector employees are matched, they will behave less cooperatively.
Negotiations between public-sector employees and private-sector employees
will lead to behavior varying between cooperation and competition. This
leads to two additional hypotheses in which cooperation is conditional on
the opponent.
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H2: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators matched to high-PSM negotiators
act more cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM negotiators.
H3: In a repeated negotiation, high-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM negotiators
act less cooperatively than high-PSM negotiators matched to high-PSM negotiators,
but more cooperatively than low-PSM negotiators matched to low-PSM negotiators.
Method and data
In order to examine the relation between negotiator type (public-sector
employee or private-sector employee) and contributions in a negotiation,
our subjects were given a low-stakes negotiation task. We tested our
hypotheses in a cubicle computer laboratory at a Dutch university in a
between-subjects design using z-Tree (version 3.4.2) to administer the
experiment (Fischbacher, 2015). A total of eight sessions was administered,
which took about 75minutes each. All communication with participants
was done by computer.
We chose a computerized laboratory experiment, as it offers specific
advantages over other experimental types (Anderson & Edwards, 2015;
Charness & Kuhn, 2011; Morton & Williams, 2010). A laboratory experi-
ment enables researchers to study the interactions between individual nego-
tiators. Moreover, a laboratory experiment offers control and reduces
potential confounding effects that are not observed (Morton & Williams,
2010). In addition, a laboratory experiment does not rely on narratives or
self-reported measures (Tepe & Prokop, 2017). Finally, by sharing the
experimental code, computerized experiments can easily be replicated by
using different samples and/or different manipulations.
We recruited graduate and undergraduate public administration and
business administration students for participation, as these students are
known to differ in PSM (Perry, 1996; Vandenabeele, 2007). These
participants registered for participation in experiments via the university
subject-pool. The participants could enroll for the experiment through
digital invitations (Greiner, 2015). Participants with more than two no-
shows were not invited to participate.
Negotiation game
The participants played a repeated symmetric linear public goods game in
100 rounds (10 times 10 decisions). A public goods game enables us to
study negotiation by tracing the offers and outcomes of individual negotia-
tors. Moreover, it offers the negotiators an opportunity to choose between
competition and cooperation (cf. Hauert, De Monte, Hofbauer, & Sigmund,
2002; Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2003).
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For each decision, the negotiators received 10 units. From those units,
the negotiators simultaneously decide how much they want to invest into a
public good. Once the contributions to the public good are made, they are
multiplied by 1.5. The total sum is equally divided over the negotiators.
The individual payoff of the negotiators is the remainder not invested from
the initial 10 units and their profit from the public good. After this step,
the process is repeated. Consequently, the individual payoffs are conditional
on the contributions of both negotiators.
A competing negotiator would choose to set the contribution as low as
possible. When both negotiators do this, a public good is not produced.
Negotiators who cooperate will contribute the maximum number of initial
units (10 in our game). This is because this will increase the odds of
obtaining a higher group outcome. Thus, contributing more equals cooper-
ation, and contributing less involves a more competitive strategy.1
The participants were reimbursed for their participation based on indi-
vidual performance. The exchange rate of experimental units to pay out
was e0.008. The participants received a show-up fee of e3, and the mean
payment was e14,80, which is slightly above minimum wage. The game
was identical for all the participants, regardless of the conditions. The par-
ticipants are aware that they play with the same opponent over the length
of the experiment; the game is repeated; and there is no rematching. The
subjects are not aware of the identity of their opponent, as they are in
computer cubicles.
Moreover, the players are monolithic in the sense that they do not have
to deal with constituencies. The negotiators have full information on the
range of potential agreements and payoffs, but are unaware of the actions
of their opponent until the outcome is calculated after each contribution
is made.
Process
Paper-based instructions were handed out and read aloud by the researcher
(see Figure 1). Then the participants received an on-screen pretest ques-
tionnaire containing generic questions (i.e., What is your year of birth? In
what type of study program are you enrolled?).
Based on the answers to the study question in the pretest questionnaire,
the participants were matched by the computer in such a manner that three
experimental conditions could be observed: a high-PSM subject plays
Instructions
Pre test
matching
questions
Randomization
Negotiation
Game
Questionnaire Debriefing
Figure 1. Process during experiment.
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against a high-PSM subject; a low-PSM subjects plays against a low-PSM
subject; and a high-PSM subject plays against a low-PSM subject (see
Table 1). As participants are either public administration or business
administration students, the matching in our experiment is stratified.
Within the strata, the matching to negotiation opponents is random.
The three experimental conditions will allow us to observe the differen-
ces between individuals with high and low PSM (Hypothesis 1) as well as
the combinations between formed dyads by focusing on the group level
(Hypothesis 2).
Following the experiment, the participants received a post-test question-
naire. Upon finishing the questionnaire, the participants were debriefed
and reimbursed based on their in-game performance. The order of events
during the experiment is presented in Figure 1.
A pilot session with n¼ 12 participants was administered prior to the
experiment. The pilot session has led to the improvement of the position-
ing of items on screen and text size of the post-test questionnaire.
The statistical power (1  b) of this particular study is 0.72 (three
groups, n¼ 104, a¼ 0.05, df¼ 17, f¼ 0.282). The tests of the three hypothe-
ses were conducted using Bonferroni correction of a¼ 0.016 per test
(0.05/3).
Post experimental questionnaire
In the post-test questionnaire, we administered a number of relevant back-
ground and demographical characteristics of the subjects. To check the the-
oretical differences between individuals in the public administration and
business administration programs, we measured PSM using the 18-question
version of the questionnaire (Vandenabeele, 2008).
As self-efficacy impacts negotiator performance, we measured negotiation
beliefs by using the standardized 7-question scale (Elfenbein, Curhan,
Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007). The ori-
ginal English version was translated and back-translated by two researchers
independently.
In order to measure stated negotiation style, the Rahim Organizational
Conflict Inventory II (ROCI-II) was used (Rahim & Magner, 1995). The
ROCI-II measure contains 28 questions that generate percentile scores on
five theoretically distinct modes of negotiations, including competition and
Table 1. Allocation of Participants During the Negotiation Game.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 2
High PSM Low PSM High PSM
l l l
High PSM Low PSM Low PSM
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cooperation. The inclusion of this instrument enables us to see to what
extent behavior in our negotiation matches to self-reported styles.
We measured social value orientation by means of a decomposed game
in which respondents choose to split a given amount over the “self” and a
fictive “other” (Van Lange, 1999). The social value orientation reveals pat-
terns of preferences of a priori outcomes for the “self” and “others.” Based
on this, people can be categorized as either pro-self, or pro-social. Pro-
social motivation has been linked to PSM (Grant, 2007). We use social
value orientation to check whether contributions are conditional, occurring
only when others contribute, or unconditional (Frey & Meier, 2004).
Results
Our main expectation is that public administration and business adminis-
tration students differ in PSM, which, in turn, leads to degrees of cooper-
ation conditional on matching. In our sample, PSM scores differ between
public administration students (M¼ 3.44, SD¼ 0.33) and business adminis-
tration students (M¼ 3.25, SD¼ 0.34) (t ¼ 2.84, p¼ 0.005). This implies
that public administration students and business administration students
differ in motives with regard to interest in politics, working for a public
cause, compassion, and self-sacrifice.
The distribution of gender expression, age, negotiation beliefs, and social
value orientation did not differ significantly over the experimental condi-
tions (see Table 2). This confirms that we have three experimental
conditions with high-PSM dyads, mixed-PSM dyads, and low-PSM dyads,
while the other background variables are stable and homogenous over the
experimental conditions. This means that any effect of the negotiation
dyads must be attributed to the matching based on PSM. Finally, the par-
ticipants in the “‘mixed” condition seem to have a lower preference for
cooperation based on the ROCI-II questionnaire (Rahim & Magner, 1995).
In further analysis, we will add this self-reported variable as a control.
The first hypothesis (H1) is supported by the data. Indeed, over the
experiment and across conditions, public administration students contrib-
uted more on average (M¼ 7.17, SD¼ 3.34) than did business administra-
tion students (M¼ 6.95, SD¼ 3.51) (t¼ 3.27, p¼ 0.001). This is also
evident from Figure 2 (right-hand side).
Our second hypothesis (H2) is not supported by the data. We have
tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, the contributions did not differ
statistically significantly over the conditions for the entire experiment
(pooled data) (see Figure 2).
Secondly, we calculated a hierarchical Tobit model in which the negoti-
ation dyads were allowed to differ from each other (see Table 3). In our
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experiment, many negotiators contributed the maximum possible amount,
which resulted in truncated data. A Tobit model is able to handle this trun-
cated data (Tobin, 1958). Moreover, a hierarchical model corrects for
dynamics between subjects that were matched together in dyads (cf.
Figure 2. Contributions by experimental condition (left side), and by study type (right side).
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Experimental Condition.
High-PSM/
High-PSM
Low-PSM/
Low-PSM
High-PSM/
Low-PSM Total Test statistic
n 30 (29%) 40 (38%) 34 (33%) 104 (100%) Chi-Squared
v2¼ 1.46
p¼ 0.481
Female-presenting 13 (43%) 20 (50%) 13 (38%) 46 (44%) Chi-Squared
v2¼ 1.04
p¼ 0.593
Age (SD) 20.73 (2.44) 21.18 (1.66) 21.52 (2.69) 21.16 (2.27) ANOVA
F¼ 0.978
p¼ 0.338
PSM (SD)
reliability¼ 0.72
3.54 (0.31) 3.30 (0.33) 3.19 (0.31) 3.33 (0.35) ANOVA
F¼ 9.76
p¼ 0.00
Negotiation beliefs (SD)
reliability¼ 0.76
2.80 (0.58) 2.69 (0.53) 2.58 (0.60) 2.69 (0.57) ANOVA
F¼ 1.18
p¼ 0.309
ROCI-II cooperation2
reliability¼ 0.74
4.06 (0.33) 4.09 (0.36) 3.88 (0.40) 4.01 (0.37) ANOVA
F¼ 3.40
p¼ 0.037
ROCI-II competition
reliability¼ 0.82
3.2 (0.79) 3.1 (0.77) 3.3 (0.71) 3.91 (0.75) ANOVA
F¼ 0.635
p¼ 0.532
Pro-social 2 (15.4%) 6 (46.15) 5 (38.36%) 13 (100%) Chi-Squared
v2¼ 2
p¼ 0.367
Pro-self 23 (28.75%) 31 (38.75%) 26 (32.5%) 80 (100%) Chi-Squared
v2¼ 1.22
p¼ 0.542
Neither pro-social nor pro-self 5 (45.45%) 3 (27.27%) 3 (27.27%) 11 (100%) Chi-Squared
v2¼ 0.727
p¼ 0.695
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Honore, 1992). From Figure 3, we learn that the slopes differ across the
conditions. Finally, a hierarchical model enables us to focus on negotiation
decisions made instead of dyad level data or condition level data. The
model was built in successive steps. For this, we used the xttobit package
for random effects in Stata (version 12.1). The experimental conditions
were recoded to dummies with the mixed (Low-PSM/High-PSM) category
as reference category.
In models I and II (Table 3), the results for the second hypothesis are
insignificant. Matching in our experiment does not have an effect on con-
tributions and cooperation during the experiment. A time dummy (period)
shows that contributions slowly increase over the experiment, and a gender
expression dummy shows that male-presenting negotiators contributed
more than did female-presenting negotiators on average. Gender expression
also has a positive significant effect on the height of the contributions dur-
ing the negotiation.
Table 3. Hierarchical Tobit Estimates on Contributions During the Experiment (negotiation
dyads as random effects.).
Model 1 Conditions
(mixed as reference)
Model 2 Period
and gender
expression
Model 3
Study type
Model 4
ROCI
Fixed effects
Intercept 9.373 8.045 9.327 10.624
(6.84) (5.90) (11.77) (9.54)
Study dummy (1¼ PA) 0.784
(5.56)
High-PSM/High-PSM dummy 0.048 0.005
(0.02) (0.00)
Low-PSM/Low-PSM dummy 0.857 0.909
(0.46) (0.49)
Period 0.180
(12.56)
Male dummy 0.595
(4.82)
ROCI cooperation 0.049
(0.31)
ROCI competition 0.355
(4.21)
Random effects
r2 Negotiation dyads 5.589 5.549 5.622 5.630
(9.55) (9.55) (9.54) (9.54)
r2 Residuals 3.503 3.485 3.494 3.497 
(98.38) (98.43) (98.39) (98.38)
Wald v2 (df) 0.30 (2) 181.34 (4) 30.95 (1) 19.46 (2)
Log likelihood 16777.20 16685.35 16761.87 16767.624
Akaike information criterion 33564.406 33384.699 33531.743 33545.495
Bayesian information criterion 33600.654 33435.446 33560.741 33581.491
n 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400
n-truncated (right) 4,853 4,853 4,853 4,853
Notes: p< 0.05;p< 0.01;p< 0.001.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Model III shows that participants enrolled in a public administration pro-
gram contributed significantly more than participants enrolled in a business
administration program, regardless of the experimental conditions (Table 3).
In the fourth model, we found an association between the contributions
during the experiment and the self-reported competitive negotiation style.
A higher score on competition was significantly associated with lower con-
tributions during the experiment. While there is a statistically significant
correlation between cooperation and competition (r ¼ 0.26, n¼ 104,
p¼ 0.007), there is no statistical association between cooperation and the
negotiation contributions in the experiment. In addition, over the length of
the experiment (Figure 3), the average contribution develops differently
across the experimental conditions. The business administration group
exhibits a slightly negative slope, whereas the public administration group
shows a positive slope, with all starting between 6.5 and 7.5 for the contri-
butions. The slope of the mixed group lies in between these curves.
The third hypothesis (H3) is not confirmed by the data. There are differ-
ences between the conditions, but these are not statistically significant. This
is evident if we visually inspect the contributions during the negotiation
(Figures 2 and 3). The level of cooperation can also be seen in models I
and II, which are corrected for time, gender expression, and matching in
dyads. Models I and II also disconfirm this hypothesis.
Discussion and conclusion
The findings of our study have some limitations, although we have tried to
alleviate them as much as possible.
First, we have used students as subjects in our experiment. Students pro-
vide a homogenous sample, which makes detecting an effect more straight-
forward (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1982). The main question remains
Figure 3. Development of contributions over time during the experiment (left¼ raw data,
right¼ smoothing applied).
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whether public- and private-sector employees would respond similarly to
the treatments in our experiment. Moreover, PSM can be seen as a rela-
tively stable predisposition (Perry & Hondeghem, 2008), or as a learned
social norm (Chen, Hsieh, & Chen, 2014; Tepe, 2016). Compared to stu-
dents, practitioners may exhibit more or less motivation based on experi-
ence and workplace socialization. Studies that compare student samples
and practitioners remain inconclusive on this particular question (e.g.,
Liyanarachchi & Milne 2005). While a substantial part of public adminis-
tration experiments employs student samples (see Li & Van Ryzin, 2017),
there is no agreement on this matter. Students have been found to behave
more “rationally” than does a generic population (Belot, Duch, & Miller,
2015). This might imply that practitioners would act less cooperatively in a
similar negotiation setting. Note that no cooperation is a Nash equilibrium,
while cooperation leads to a higher payoff at both individual and group
levels. Moreover, practitioners are socialized in their respective sectors,
which may induce more collaborative behavior in public managers as a
consequence of learned roles and more competition in private-sector man-
agers. This limitation and its implications call for more research, including
experimental designs using practitioner samples.
Second, the participants in our experiment were financially incentivized.
Compared to the situation in practice, individual negotiators, especially those
in the public service are not incentivized, as public budgets are prioritized,
and rewards for individual behavior are uncommon (Verhoest, Roness,
Verschuere, Rubecksen, & MacCarthaigh, 2010). Similarly, it could be argued
from the view of transaction cost theory that in high-stakes negotiations,
negotiators will weigh the consequences of cooperative or competitive behav-
ior more diligently (Jap, Robertson, Rindfleisch, & Hamilton, 2013). The latter
is especially relevant, as many professional negotiations are, in fact, principal-
agent settings. We leave to future research resolving how individual PSM
influences behavior in these more complex and realistic settings.
Third, a laboratory experiment provides an artificial situation in which
our subjects are asked to negotiate. A laboratory experiment offers control
to the researcher while it also reduces the risk of confounding effects. In
our experiment, liking or body language presents a potential risk in study-
ing negotiations, which could distort our findings in a face-to-face experi-
ment (Morton & Williams, 2010). As in many experimental designs,
experimenter demand effects could have an impact on our findings (Orne,
1962; see Zizzo, 2010). Similarly, it is possible that the lower than ideal
power in this study has led to false negatives. Consequently, replication of
this study is much needed, preferably with a sample of practitioners.
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature, by bringing
together literature on negotiation and individual characteristics of future
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public- and private-sector employees. Negotiations at the individual level
are seldom studied in public management literature. Our study brings
together negotiation literature with PSM. We study behavior in a repeated
negotiation, which differs from single-shot interactions that have been
studied in relation to cooperative behavior (Esteve et al., 2015). We address
the generalizability of studies that focus on cooperation in decision making
by extending it to negotiations.
Second, we contribute to the field by using an experimental laboratory
design that enables us to study behavior of individuals and dyads of nego-
tiators. Although experimental research designs are common in negotia-
tions research, experimental laboratory designs are still relatively rare in
public administration (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; Li & Van
Ryzin, 2017). Experimental designs fit well when there is a focus on behav-
ior by using microlevel theory with individual decision makers
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017).
We found that overall, high-PSM individuals (public administration stu-
dents) behave more cooperatively than low-PSM individuals (business
administration students). In general, individuals tend to cooperate in
repeated public goods experiments (Fischbacher, G€achter, & Fehr, 2001).
Although this game is a low-stakes negotiation setting, preferring a
cooperative negotiation style is potentially beneficial at the group level,
rather than at the individual level. Recent studies have found that individu-
als are sometimes conditional cooperators whose cooperation heavily
depends on the precedent of a collective (Delfgaauw & Dur, 2010). In our
study, participants could only see how they performed in dyads and not
how others performed. For the public sector, this is especially relevant, as
one of the demands placed on public-sector employees is that they ought
to behave cooperatively to facilitate problem-solving (McNamara, 2012;
O’Leary & Bingham, 2009). Our study shows that high-PSM people also
cooperate unconditionally. The latter could be a specific effect of the motiv-
ation by high-PSM individuals to contribute to the public good . As nego-
tiations generate public outcomes with real consequences in the public
sector, this finding shows that reaching agreement by cooperation seems to
be prioritized by high-PSM individuals.
Additionally, in repeated public goods games, the trend of contributions
is often found to have a downward slope (Fehr & G€achter, 2000). When
players negotiate repeatedly, they tend to punish freeriding behavior, even
if it is costly. In our experiment, the slope is slightly upward for the high-
PSM dyads, implying that they may have punished freeriding behavior to a
lesser degree. This raises the question of whether public managers are less
likely to punish competitive behavior in practice, as private-sector manag-
ers (high-PSM) do (cf. Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). Moreover, it implies that
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low-PSM individuals use more unethical tactics, regardless of their oppo-
nents (e.g., Robinson et al., 2000).
In our experiment, the motives of the matched opponents have no
significant effect on the contributions in the negotiations. This finding con-
trasts sharply with the social-psychological literature on this matter. For
instance, Greenhalgh, Neslin, and Gilkey (1985) found that personality
directly affects negotiator contributions and outcomes. Building on similarity-
attraction theory, attitudinally like-minded negotiators are found to experience
less conflict and also reach agreement faster (Wilson, DeRue, Matta, Howe, &
Conlon, 2016). Note that our participants could only communicate by offer
and counteroffer, whereas in the experiment of Greenhalgh et al. (1985) and
the experiments of Wilson et al. (2016), negotiators could also see each other.
The differences between the public and private sector have blurred over the
past years as the result of NPM developments in the public sector and CSR
developments in the private sector (Bullock, Stritch, & Rainey, 2015). This
blurring of sectors indicates the need for knowledge on this topic (Antonsen
& Jørgensen, 1997). Whether the characteristics and motives of the practi-
tioners in the formerly distinct sectors are also more alike is unclear. Based on
our experiment, high-PSM and low-PSM individuals behaved differently and
also diverged from the standardized ROCI questionnaire. This finding in a
repetitive negotiation setting partly mirrors the findings of Esteve et al. (2015).
These findings are of particular relevance for settings where public- and pri-
vate-sector workers need to cooperate, as, for instance, in public-private part-
nerships. Because cooperation levels—and thus, outcomes—differ for the
negotiators from the different sectors, this may put public-sector negotiators
at a comparative disadvantage in win-lose negotiations. However, in negotia-
tions more complex, the tendency to cooperate may lubricate negotiations.
How this works and to what extent this can be understood from the perspec-
tive of PSM opens an important avenue for further research.
Our findings have two important implications for public managers and
policymakers. First, it suggests that public managers (high-PSM) will col-
laborate more unconditionally. This is beneficial in variable-sum negotia-
tions, while it may be harmful in constant- or zero-sum negotiations.
Second, for public managers, it may prove difficult to reach agreement in
repeated variable-sum negotiations with low-PSM negotiators, such as pri-
vate-sector negotiators or entrepreneurs.
Future research efforts could be aimed at replicating this study by using
different samples, such as with practitioners and in different contexts.
Moreover, a replication using a different multiplier in the public goods
game or testing cooperation with payoffs in the domain of losses
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) seems a good addition. Similarly, it is unclear
under what circumstances individuals behave competitively or cooperatively
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when they report to have no strong preference for a particular style of
negotiations. Although we did find a relation between contributions and
self-reported competition, more research is needed to find under what cir-
cumstances self-reported measures align with measured behavior.
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